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Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) operates an online “social network” that permits its members

14

to interact with each other through a website - www.facebook.com. Id. at ¶ 9. This consolidated,

15

multi-district lawsuit against the social network, brought by and on behalf of individuals with

16

active Facebook accounts from May 27, 2010, through September 26, 2011 (the “Class Period”),

17

seeks “in excess of $15 billion in damages and injunctive relief” and “arises from Facebook’s

18

knowing interception of users’ internet communications and activity after logging out of their

19

Facebook accounts.” See Corrected First Am. Consolidated Class Action Compl. (“CCAC”),

20

Docket Item No. 35, at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs Perrin Davis, Cynthia Quinn, Brian Lentz, and Matthew

21

Vickery (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), each of whom had an active Facebook account during the

22

entire Class Period, allege that Facebook tracked and stored their post-logout internet usage using

23

small text files - or “cookies” - which Facebook had embedded in their computers’ browsers. Id.

24

at ¶¶ 103-106.

25

Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(d). Presently before

26

the court is Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

27

and 12(b)(6). See Docket Item No. 44. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Having carefully considered

28
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1

the parties’ arguments, the court has concluded that Facebook’s arguments are meritorious.

2

Accordingly, the motion will be granted for the reasons explained below.

3

BACKGROUND
“Cookies”

4

A.

5

As noted, a “cookie” is a small text file that a server creates and sends to a browser, which

6

then stores the file in a particular directory on an individual’s computer. Id. at ¶ 38. A cookie

7

contains a limited amount of information which can relate to the browser or to a specific

8

individual. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 39.

9
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I.

When an individual using a web browser contacts a server - often represented by a

10

particular webpage or internet address - the browser software checks to see if that server has

11

previously set any cookies on the individual’s computer. Id. at ¶ 39. If the server recognizes any

12

valid, unexpired cookies, then the computer “sends” those cookies to the server. Id. at ¶ 39. After

13

examining the information stored in the cookie, the server knows if it is interacting with a

14

computer with which it has interacted before. Id. at ¶ 41. Since servers create database records

15

that correspond to individuals, sessions and browsers, the server can locate the database record

16

that corresponds to the individual, session or browser using the information from the cookie. Id.
Facebook and its Use of “Cookies”

17

B.

18

Plaintiffs allege that Facebook is the brainchild of the company’s founder, Mark

19

Zuckerberg, who wrote the first version of “The Facebook” in his Harvard University dorm room

20

and later launched Facebook as a company in 2004. Id. at ¶ 10. Since then, Facebook has become

21

the largest social networking site in the world with other 800 million users world-wide and over

22

150 million users in the United States. Id. at ¶ 11. According to Plaintiffs, the key to this success

23

“was to convince people to create unique, individualized profiles with such personal information

24

as employment history and political and religious affiliations, which then could be shared among

25

their own network of family and friends.” Id. at ¶ 10. Facebook uses this repository of personal

26

data to connect advertisers with its users. Id. at ¶ 12. Historically, 90% of Facebook’s revenue is

27

attributable to third-party advertising and “Facebook is driven to continue to find new and creative

28
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1
2

Facebook does not charge a fee for membership. Id. at ¶ 14. However, Plaintiffs contend

3

that Facebook membership is not free. Id. at ¶ 14. Specifically, they allege that through the

4

Statement of Rights and Responsibilities and other documents and policies governing use of the

5

website, “Facebook conditions its membership upon users providing sensitive and personal

6

information . . . including name, birth date, gender and email address,” and requires that users

7

accept numerous Facebook cookies on their computers. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16. These cookies allow

8

Facebook to intercept a user’s electronic communications and track internet browsing history. Id.

9
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ways to leverage its access to users’ data in order to sustain its phenomenal growth.” Id. at ¶ 13.

Facebook cookies come in two flavors. The first is a “session cookie,” which is set when a

10

user logs into Facebook. Id. at ¶ 15. It is directly associated with a user’s Facebook account and

11

contains unique information, such as the user’s Facebook identification. Id. Session cookies are

12

supposed to be deleted when the user logs out of Facebook. Id.

13

The second type is a “tracking cookie,” which is also known as a persistent cookie. Id.

14

This cookie sends data back to Facebook any time an individual makes a request of

15

www.facebook.com, such as when an individual accesses a page with the Facebook “like” button.

16

Id. The tracking takes place, however, regardless of whether the individual actually interacts with

17

the “like” button; “[i]n effect, Facebook is getting details of where you go on the Internet.” Id.

18

Tracking cookies do not expire when a user logs out of Facebook. Id. In fact, Facebook sets these

19

cookies on an individual’s computer whether or not they have a Facebook account. Id.

20

When a Facebook user leaves the Facebook webpage without logging out and then

21

browses the web, both tracking cookies (such as a “datr” cookie) and session cookies (such as a

22

“c_user” cookie) are left to operate on the computer. Id. Under those circumstances, Facebook is

23

notified through the datr cookie whenever the user loads a page with embedded content from

24

Facebook, and also can easily connect that data back to the user’s individual Facebook profile

25

through the c_user cookie. Id.

26

For example, if a logged-in Facebook user accesses the news website www.cnn.com

27

through the browser on his or her computer, the CNN server responds with the file for the CNN

28
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1

homepage, which also contains embedded code from Facebook. Id. at ¶¶ 59, 60. The user’s

2

browser, triggered by the Facebook code, sends a request to the Facebook server to display certain

3

content on the CNN webpage, such as the Facebook “like” button. Id. at ¶ 61. This request also

4

includes information contained in the user’s datr and c_user cookies as well as the specific details

5

of the webpage that the user accessed. Id. at ¶ 63. When Facebook receives this information, the

6

Facebook server adds it to its database records for the browser and the user. Id. at ¶ 67. The

7

Facebook server then responds by sending the requested content to the user’s browser. Id. at ¶ 70.

8

C.

9

Aside from tracking logged-in users, Plaintiffs allege that Facebook has also intentionally

Facebook Tracks Logged-Out Users

10

tracked users’ browsing activity after they logged-out of the Facebook website despite contrary

11

representations in the social network’s governing materials. Id. at ¶ 17. Facebook is able to

12

engage in such tracking though the persistent datr cookie its server embeds after the user accesses

13

www.facebook.com. Id. at ¶ 73.

14

Again using the CNN website as an example, if a user logs out of Facebook and then

15

directs his or her computer’s browser to www.cnn.com, the CNN server responds in much the

16

same way as if the user was still logged-in to Facebook: by sending to the browser a file with the

17

contents of the CNN website which contains a piece of Facebook code pertaining to the “like”

18

button. Id. at ¶¶ 72-75. The browser, triggered by the Facebook code, sends a request to the

19

Facebook server to display the “like” button on the CNN webpage. Id. at ¶ 77. This request also

20

includes any personally identifiable information contained in cookies associated with the browser,

21

such as the datr cookie. Id. at ¶ 78. The Facebook server then creates a database log entry of the

22

request, stores the cookie information it received, and responds by sending the content requested

23

for display on the CNN website. Id. at ¶¶ 78-82.

24

Plaintiffs allege the information Facebook receives through tracking logged-out users is

25

specific enough to identify the user without the need for an additional Facebook cookie containing

26

the user’s identification. Id. at ¶ 83. Indeed, they allege that “[f]rom the first time a Facebook

27

user logs into Facebook and the datr tracking cookie is set on his machine, all of that user’s

28
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1

browsing to Facebook partner sites using that browser is linked by Facebook back to that user

2

because the datr tracking cookie contains a unique number, which is also unique to that particular

3

user’s browser and his specific computer or mobile device, that indexes into the Facebook

4

database which tracks users and browser sessions both on computers and mobile devices such as

5

Android cell phones, iPhones, iPads, and the iPod Touch.” Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs believe that

6

Facebook implemented a P3P “compact policy”1 that circumvented privacy settings on

7

Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (“IE”) browser to allow Facebook’s cookies, thereby ensuring that

8

IE would transmit information from Facebook cookies back to the Facebook server when users

9

visited affiliated non-Facebook websites. Id. at ¶¶ 101, 102.
Plaintiffs contend that the personal information Facebook receives from its users, including

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10
11

users’ browsing history, has “massive economic value” and that a market exists for such

12

information. Id. at ¶¶ 112, 122-124. They point out that “internet giant” Google, Inc. conducts a

13

panel called “Google Screenwise Trends,” the purpose of which is “to learn more about how

14

everyday people use the Internet.” Id. at ¶ 118. Through this program, internet users consent to

15

share with Google the websites they visit and how they use them in exchange for gift cards,

16

“mostly valued at exactly $5.” Id. at ¶¶ 119, 121.
Plaintiffs further allege the value of their personal information can be quantified. Id. at ¶

17
18

116. Based on a study published in 2011, Plaintiffs allege that the contact information users must

19

provide to Facebook when becoming a member is worth $4.20 per year. Id. In addition,

20

demographic information is worth $3.00 per year and web browsing histories are worth $52.00 per

21

year. Id. Aggregated across Facebook’s approximately 800 million users, these values translate

22

into membership “fees” of $3.36 billion, $2.4 billion and $41.6 billion, respectively, for each

23

category of information. Id.

24
25
26
27
28

1

According to the CCAC, “P3P” refers to the Platform for Privacy Preferences, which is a
standard format for computer-readable privacy policies published by the World Wide Web
Consortium in 2002. See CCAC, at ¶ 86. A P3P “compact policy” is a computer-readable
encoded version of the portion of a privacy policy relating to cookies. Id.
5
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D.

1

Relevant Procedural History

A number of cases challenging Facebook’s tracking practices were filed in and outside this
2
district. They were eventually transferred to the undersigned. The court consolidated the cases for
3
pretrial consideration and appointed interim class counsel. See Docket Item No. 19. Plaintiffs
4
thereafter filed the CCAC, which is the currently operative pleading. See Docket Item No. 35.
5
This motion followed.
6
7
8

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges subject matter jurisdiction and may be either facial or
9
factual. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.2004). A facial 12(b)(1) motion involves
10
an inquiry confined to the allegations in the complaint, whereas a factual 12(b)(1) motion permits
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

the court to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Id. When, as here, a defendant
12
makes a facial challenge, all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the court
13
must determine whether lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the complaint itself.
14

Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. Elec., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979).

15
Standing is properly challenged through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d
16
17

1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “A plaintiff has the burden to establish that it has standing.”
WildEarth Guardians v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2015).

18
19

B.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient
20
21
22
23

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).
Although particular detail is not generally necessary, the factual allegations “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Id.

24
at 556-57. A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to
25

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule

26
12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts
27
28
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1

to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,

2

1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

3

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court usually “may not consider

4

any material beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d

5

1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). However, the court may consider material submitted as part of

6

the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and may also consider material subject to judicial

7

notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
In addition, the court must generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.”

United States District Court
Northern District of California

8
9

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court also must construe the alleged facts in the

10

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir.1988).

11

But “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.

12

Nor must the court accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial

13

notice or by exhibit” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

14

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

15

III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert the following claims in the CCAC: (1) violation of the Federal Wiretap

16
17

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.; (2) violation of the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C.

18

§ 2701 et seq.; (3) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 10302;

19

(4) invasion of privacy; (5) intrusion upon seclusion; (6) conversion; (7) trespass to chattels; (8)

20

violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Business and Professions Code §

21

17200 et seq.; (9) violation of the California Computer Crime Law (“CCCL”), Penal Code § 502;

22

(10) violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Penal Code § 630 et seq.; and

23

(11) violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Civil Code § 1750.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), Facebook argues that all of these claims fail for lack of standing.

24
25

Under Rule 12(b)(6), Facebook further argues that the fraud-based claims lack the factual

26
27
28

2

Plaintiffs have withdrawn this claim. It will therefore be dismissed without leave to amend.
7
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1

specificity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and that Plaintiffs have not stated an

2

actionable claim. These arguments are discussed below.

3

United States District Court
Northern District of California

4

A.

Standing
i.

Constitutional Standing

5

The constitutional standing doctrine “functions to ensure, among other things, that the

6

scarce resources of the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a

7

concrete stake.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191

8

(2000). Generally, the inquiry critical to any standing issue is “‘whether the litigant is entitled to

9

have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.’” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.

10

737, 750-51 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Standing under Article

11

III of the Constitution has three basic elements: (1) an “injury in fact,” which is neither conjectural

12

or hypothetical, (2) causation, such that a causal connection between the alleged injury and

13

offensive conduct is established, and (3) redressability, or a likelihood that the injury will be

14

redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

15

Noting the lack of allegations that anyone was willing to pay for their personal information

16

or that its purported conduct lessened the value of that information or affected its marketability,

17

Facebook argues that Plaintiffs have not established a cognizable injury in fact. To satisfy the

18

“injury in fact” element, “the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or

19

threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Gladstone Realtors

20

v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). Moreover, since this is a class action, at least

21

one of the named plaintiffs must have suffered an injury in fact. See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut.

22

Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting

23

to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none

24

may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.”).

25

When confronted with data privacy claims similar to the ones brought by Plaintiffs, courts

26

have found insufficient for standing purposes generalized assertions of economic harm based

27

solely on the alleged value of personal information. In LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No.

28

8
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1

SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543, 2011 WL 1661532 (C.D. Cal. Apr.

2

28, 2011), the plaintiffs alleged that Specific Media, “an online third party ad network that earns

3

its revenue by delivering targeted advertisements,” stored cookies on their computers, which it

4

then used to collect browsing history information in order to create behavioral profiles and target

5

specific categories of ads at different users. LaCourt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543, at *2. The

6

plaintiffs also claimed that Specific Media’s conduct caused them economic loss “in that their

7

personal information has discernable value” of which they were deprived, and which Specific

8

Media retained and used for its own benefit. Id. at *3-4. Specific Media moved to dismiss the

9

complaint for lack of Article III standing under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the plaintiffs’ theory of

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

economic harm did not make out an injury in fact. Id. at *7.
The district court agreed with Specific Media and dismissed the complaint. The court

12

determined that, while it “probably would decline to say that it is categorically impossible for [the

13

plaintiffs] to allege some property interest that was compromised” by Specific Media’s

14

information collection practices, the plaintiffs had not alleged they were actually deprived of the

15

economic value of their browsing histories. Id. at *11. The court reasoned this was so because the

16

plaintiffs had not cited “some particularized example” of “a single individual who was foreclosed

17

from entering into a ‘value-for-value exchange’ as a result of Specific Media’s alleged conduct,”

18

or explained how they were deprived of the information’s value simply because it was collected

19

by a third party. Id. at *11-12.

20

A similar conclusion was reached in Low v. LinkedIn Corporation, No.11-CV-01468-

21

LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130840, 2011 WL 5509848 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011). There, the

22

plaintiff alleged economic loss from LinkedIn’s practice of transmitting users’ personal

23

information, such as the name of each user and his or her profile viewing history, to third party

24

tracking cookies which allowed the recipients to aggregate the data. Low, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

25

130840, at *3-4. Relying on LaCourt, the court found the plaintiff’s allegations “too abstract and

26

hypothetical to support Article III” standing. Id. at *10. The court reasoned that the plaintiff

27

failed to demonstrate that he personally suffered some type of real economic harm due to the

28

9
Case No.: 5:12-md-02314-EJD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 5:12-md-02314-EJD Document 87 Filed 10/23/15 Page 10 of 19

1

United States District Court
Northern District of California

2

transmission of his personal information. Id. at *12-15.
An out-of-circuit case, In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation

3

(“Google Cookie Placement”), 988 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2013), is also of note. The

4

plaintiffs in that case alleged that Google had employed third-party cookies to track consumer

5

internet browsing for use in targeted advertising without first obtaining consent to do so. 988 F.

6

Supp. 2d at 440. Much like the district court did in LaCourt, the Delaware district court accepted

7

the plaintiffs’ contention that their personally identifiable information had “some modicum of

8

identifiable value to an individual plaintiff.” Id. at 442. But the court found that value alone was

9

insufficient to establish Article III standing, explaining that the plaintiffs had not “sufficiently

10

alleged that the ability to monetize their [personally identifiable information had] been diminished

11

or lost by virtue of Google’s collection of it.” Id.

12

The court finds these decisions instructive mainly because Plaintiffs’ allegations are

13

virtually indistinguishable from those rejected in LaCourt, Low and Google Cookie Placement.

14

Like the plaintiffs in those cases, Plaintiffs allege that the information collected by Facebook’s

15

cookies have economic value and, if the study cited in the CCAC is accurate, that value may be

16

significant when user information is aggregated. The court accepts as true Plaintiffs’ ascription of

17

some degree of intrinsic value to their personal information for this motion. But what Plaintiffs

18

have failed to do is adequately connect this value to a realistic economic harm or loss that is

19

attributable to Facebook’s alleged conduct. In other words, Plaintiffs have not shown, for the

20

purposes of Article III standing, that they personally lost the opportunity to sell their information

21

or that the value of their information was somehow diminished after it was collected by Facebook.

22

Unlike other data privacy cases, Plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a limited market

23

for their browsing histories. That allegation, however, is still not enough to establish a qualifying

24

injury in fact. That programs may exist to compensate internet users with $5 gift cards in

25

exchange for monitoring their browsing activity is a fact of little assistance to Plaintiffs when they

26

have not also alleged an inability to participate in these programs after Facebook collected their

27
28
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1

information.3
Nor do the allegations of consequential damages incurred by one plaintiff, Davis, provide a

2
3

persuasive basis to find a sufficiently-pled injury in fact. Other than a conclusory allegation

4

deeming it so, it is not apparent how charges for an email service which alerts users when

5

Facebook makes changes to its privacy policy or privacy settings are “fairly traceable” to the

6

conduct alleged in the complaint.4 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Moreover, the allegations related

7

to the monitoring service are too vague without a specified timeframe describing when these

8

damages accrued.
As pled, the CCAC only alludes to injury that is conjectural or hypothetical. Since

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9
10

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Facebook’s conduct resulted in some concrete and

11

particularized harm, they have not articulated a cognizable basis for standing pursuant to Article

12

III.

13

ii.

Statutory Standing

14

For their part, Plaintiffs do not directly address Facebook’s constitutional standing

15

argument, choosing instead to focus on statutory standing. Thus, the issue becomes whether any

16

of the statutory claims asserted in the CCAC can satisfy the federal standing requirement.
Although it cannot be supplanted by a statute, an Article III injury can exist solely by

17
18

virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.” Edwards v. First

19

Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010); see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)

20

(“Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

3

Notably, this reasoning is unaffected by Ninth Circuit’s 2014 limited standing discussion in In re
Facebook Privacy Litigation, 572 Fed. Appx. 494 (2014). A review of the facts of that case, as
illustrated in the companion opinion In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, 750 F.3d 1098 (2014), reveals
that Facebook was disclosing identifying information to third-party websites in referer headers.
Given that no such disclosure is alleged here, any Article III standing determination made in
Facebook Privacy Litigation is inapplicable to this case.
4

In their opposition, Plaintiffs raise several new facts relating to consequential damages and other
issues. Those facts have no bearing on whether the CCAC is adequate. See Schneider v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The ‘new’ allegations contained in the .
. . opposition motion . . . are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”).
11
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1

to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”). The relevant question in such

2

circumstances is “whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests

3

properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”

4

Id.

5

So-called “statutory standing” can be established by pleading a violation of a right

6

conferred by statute so long as the plaintiff alleges “a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even

7

if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.” Warth, 522 U.S. at 501.

8

Whether or not a plaintiff has stated a basis for statutory standing is tested under Rule 12(b)(6)

9

rather than Rule 12(b)(1). Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011).
Here, Plaintiffs’ arguments in support of statutory standing are uncompelling for several of

United States District Court
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10
11

their claims. First, it is axiomatic that standing permitted by statute does not translate into

12

standing for common law claims. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)

13

(holding that standing is not “dispensed in gross” and must be established for each claim and each

14

form of relief). Thus, all of the common law claims asserted in the CCAC which rely on

15

economic harm related to the loss of personal information as an element of damages, in particular

16

the claims for conversion and trespass to chattels, are subject to dismissal for lack of constitutional

17

standing under Article III.5 See Low, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130840, at *2 (dismissing similar

18

common law claims for lack of Article III standing).
Second, the court agrees with Facebook that three of Plaintiffs’ statutory claims, those for

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

5

In any event, the claims for invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion are also subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim even if Plaintiffs rely on some other form of damage for these
claims. To the extent they can be considered separate claims - a concept which is itself
questionable - both require “(1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a
manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Shulman v.Group W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th
200, 214 & n.4 (1996); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 66 (1994). To
establish the first element, the plaintiff must have had an actual, subjective expectation of
seclusion that was objectively reasonable. Med Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 306 F.3d
806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the current allegations, Plaintiffs could not have held a
subjective expectation of privacy in their browsing histories that was objectively reasonable
because “Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the . . . IP addresses of the websites they
visit . . . .” United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs “should know
that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose
of directing the routing of information.” Id.
12
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1

violation of the UCL, CLRA and the CCCL, require a plausible economic injury for standing.

2

Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To establish standing to bring a

3

claim under [the UCL and CLRA], plaintiffs must meet an economic injury-in-fact requirement,

4

which demands no more than the corresponding requirement under Article III of the U.S.

5

Constitution.”); Cal. Penal Code § 502(e) (conferring standing to bring a civil action on owners or

6

lessees of a “computer, computer system, computer network, computer program, or data who

7

suffer[] damage or loss by reason of a violation” of the CCCL). Consequently, the statutory

8

standing analysis for these claims coincides with the Article III analysis.

9

The three remaining statutory claims are different, however, because economic injury is

10

not a prerequisite for standing under their provisions. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.,

11

631 F.3d 939, 947 (2011) (“The existence of federal standing ‘often turns on the nature and source

12

of the claim asserted.’”). As to the Wiretap Act, “courts in this district have found that allegations

13

of a Wiretap Act violation are sufficient to establish standing.” In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No.

14

13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at *63, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

15

26, 2013); 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (“[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is . .

16

. disclosed . . . may in a civil action recover from the person or entity . . . such relief as may be

17

appropriate.”). The same is true of the SCA. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d

18

1040, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Other courts in this district have recognized that a violation of the

19

Wiretap Act or the Stored Communications Act may serve as a concrete injury for the purposes of

20

Article III injury analysis.”); Gaos v. Google, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-4809 EJD, 2012 U.S. Dist.

21

LEXIS 44062, at *9, 2012 WL 109446 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Thus, a violation of one’s

22

statutory rights under the SCA is a concrete injury.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (“[A]ny . . . person

23

aggrieved by any violation of this chapter in which the conduct constituting the violation is

24

engaged in with a knowing or intentional state of mind may, in a civil action, recover from the

25

person or entity . . . which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.”). And

26

because it specifically excludes economic damages as a precursor to liability, the court concludes

27

that allegations of a CIPA violation sufficiently establish standing under that statute as well. Cal.

28

13
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1

Penal Code § 637.2 (“It is not a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that the

2

plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages.”); In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.,

3

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at *67 (“[T]he Court finds that CIPA and the Wiretap Act are not

4

distinguishable for the purposes of standing.”).

5

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Facebook intercepted and tracked their internet activity and

6

acquired this information after they logged out of the Facebook website using the datr cookie

7

embedded on their computers. Plaintiffs also assert this conduct violated the Wiretap Act, SCA

8

and CIPA. Consistent with other district courts to have examined statutory standing to bring

9

similar claims, this court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to make out a distinct and palpable

10

injury considering the conduct prohibited by those statutes. In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.

11

Supp. 2d 705, 712 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“The Wiretap Act provides that any person whose electronic

12

communication is ‘intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used’ in violation of the Act may in a

13

civil action recover from the entity which engaged in that violation.”); Gaos, 2012 U.S. Dist.

14

LEXIS 44062, at *8 (explaining that the SCA “prohibits an electronic communication service

15

from divulging the contents of a communication in electronic storage . . . and prohibits a remote

16

computing service from divulging the contents of communications carried or maintained on that

17

service”); In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at *58 (observing that

18

CIPA “prohibits wiretapping or ‘any other unauthorized connection’ with a ‘wire, line, cable, or

19

instrument.’”).

20

In sum, Plaintiffs have established statutory standing for claims under the Wiretap Act,

21

SCA and CIPA. The court is mindful, however, that the issue of standing is distinct from whether

22

or not Plaintiffs have actually stated a plausible claim. In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp.

23

2d at 712 n. 5 (“A plaintiff may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirements to have standing under

24

Article III, and thus may be able to ‘bring a civil action without suffering dismissal for want of

25

standing to sue,’ without being able to assert a cause of action successfully.”). All other claims,

26

however, will be dismissed with leave to amend for lack of standing. Since this dismissal will

27

encompass the UCL, CLRA and CCCL claims, the court need not address Facebook’s argument

28

14
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1

under Rule 9(b).

2

B.

3

The court now turns to whether Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim under the Wiretap

4
5
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6

Sufficiency of Allegations

Act, SCA or CIPA.
i.

The Wiretap Act and SCA

The Wiretap Act and SCA represent “two chapters” within the Electronic Communications

7

Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”). In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014).

8

Title I of the ECPA, which contains the Wiretap Act, “provides that (with certain exceptions), ‘a

9

person or entity’ (1) ‘providing an electronic communication service to the public’ (2) ‘shall not

10

intentionally divulge the contents of any communication (other than one to such person or entity,

11

or an agent thereof)’ (3) ‘while in transmission on that service’ (4) ‘to any person or entity other

12

than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or

13

intended recipient.’” Id. at 1104 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a)). Title II of ECPA is the SCA,

14

which “covers access to electronic information stored in third party computers.” Id. (citing 18

15

U.S.C. §§ 2701-12). Under the portion of the SCA relevant here, “whoever (1) intentionally

16

accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is

17

provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains,

18

alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic

19

storage in such system” is subject to liability. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). For a civil action under the

20

SCA, the conduct constituting the violation must have been done with “a knowing or intentional

21

state of mind.” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).

22

Facebook argues the CCAC’s claim under the Wiretap Act is insufficient because

23

Plaintiffs did not plead that Facebook intercepted the “contents” of an electronic communication.

24

Under the Wiretap Act, the “contents” of a communication are defined as “any information

25

concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). The

26

Ninth Circuit has held that as used in the Wiretap Act “the term ‘contents’ refers to the intended

27

message conveyed by the communication, and does not include record information regarding the

28

15
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1

characteristics of the message that is generated in the course of the communication” such as a

2

name, address, or the identify of a subscriber or customer. In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d at

3

1106-1107. Applying this holding, the court went on to find that a “referer header” - basically the

4

portion of a webpage request message that provides the address of the webpage from which the

5

request was sent - does not meet the Wiretap Act’s definition of “contents.” Id. “[T]he webpage

6

address identifies the location of a webpage a user is viewing on the internet, and therefore

7

functions like an ‘address’ . . . . Congress excluded this sort of record information from the

8

definition of ‘contents.’” Id.

United States District Court
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9

For Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim, Zynga Privacy Litigation poses a significant hurdle.

10

Although Plaintiffs do not specify just what information of theirs was intercepted by Facebook,

11

Plaintiffs generally allege that, through cookies embedded on a user’s browser, Facebook receives

12

personal information about logged-out users information as well as the identity of the webpages

13

that the users visited. But since they also allege in other portions of the CCAC that c_user and

14

datr cookies contain only a Facebook user’s unique identification information and a record of

15

browsing history, they have not alleged that Facebook intercepted anything that qualifies as

16

“content” under the Wiretap Act. In turn, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under the statute. In

17

fact, since the intercepted information described in the CCAC is so similar to the referer headers

18

addressed in Zynga Privacy Litigation, Plaintiffs may never be able to state an action Wiretap Act

19

claim, particularly since their arguments on this issue are unpersuasive.

20

The SCA claim is also deficient. As relevant here, “electronic storage” means “any

21

temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic

22

transmission thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A). The “language and legislative history” of the

23

definition “make evident” that “electronic storage” does include cookies stored on a user’s

24

computer; “[r]ather it appears that the section is specifically targeted at communications

25

temporarily stored by electronic communications services incident to their transmission - for

26

example, when an email service stores a message until the addressee downloads it.” In re

27

Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Toys R Us, Inc.,

28

16
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1

Privacy Litig., No. M-00-1381 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *10-11, 2001 WL

2

34517252 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001). Plaintiff’s theory under the SCA as it is currently described in

3

the CCAC - that Facebook accesses personal information through persistent cookies permanently

4

residing in users’ personal web browsers - cannot be reconciled with the temporary nature of

5

storage contemplated by the statutory definition. The case upon which Plaintiffs rely, Doe v. City

6

and County of San Francisco, No. C10-04700 TEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81305, 2012 WL

7

2132398 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 12, 2012), does not hold otherwise and, in fact, is consistent with this

8

discussion because the “electronic storage” at issue there was a webmail inbox. Accordingly,

9

Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violation of the SCA in the CCAC.

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

ii.

The section of CIPA upon which Plaintiffs base their claim, Penal Code § 631, establishes
liability for:

13

[a]ny person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or
contrivance, or in any other manner, intentionally taps, or makes any
unauthorized connection, whether physically, electrically,
acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or
telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line,
cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication
system, or who willfully and without the consent of all parties to the
communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts
to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report,
or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any
wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place
within this state.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

CIPA

Cal. Penal Code § 631(a).

21

Facebook challenges the CIPA claim on multiple grounds, two of which are misplaced. It

22

first contends that this criminal statute should be narrowly construed and should not be applied to

23

electronic communications. Because that argument has been made before and squarely rejected,

24

the court rejects it again here. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at

25

*76-79.

26

Second, Facebook argues it cannot be considered an unauthorized participant in the

27

transmission of Plaintiffs’ personal information because the process of tracking their browsing

28

17
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1

activity involved communication with a Facebook server. This characterization of the allegations

2

is incomplete because Plaintiffs allege they were unaware that Facebook was surreptitiously

3

tracking them after they logged out of the Facebook website. Thus, while it is true that a

4

Facebook server was involved, there are no allegations in the CCAC which demonstrate that

5

Plaintiffs knew that fact while their browsing activity was being tracked and collected. The cases

6

relied on by Facebook are inapposite because each involved recording by a known participant to a

7

telephone conversation. See Warden v. Kahn, 99 Cal. App. 3d 805, 808-809 (1979); see also

8

Rogers v. Ulrich, 52 Cal. App. 3d 894, 896 (1976).

9

Facebook’s third and fourth arguments are well-taken, however. Plaintiffs have not pled

10

facts to show how Facebook used a “machine, instrument, or contrivance” to obtain the contents

11

of communications. While it is undeniable that a computer may qualify as a “machine,” Plaintiffs

12

must complete the scenario by explaining how Facebook’s cookies fall into one of the three

13

categories enumerated in the statute. To be sure, the cookie is a required piece under Plaintiffs’

14

theory because the offensive transmission of information between two computers - the user’s

15

computer and the Facebook server - apparently does not occur without it. Thus, if a cookie is truly

16

a “contrivance” as Plaintiffs contend, a word they define as a “device, especially a mechanical

17

one” or “plan or scheme,” Plaintiffs must include facts in their pleading to show why it is so. In

18

its current form, the CCAC only defines a cookie as a small text file containing a limited amount

19

of information which sits idly on a user’s computer until contacted by a server.

20

Nor have Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Facebook obtained the contents of a

21

communication attributable to any of them. The section of the CCAC which does purport to

22

provide Plaintiffs’ “specific factual allegations” is anything but specific. In essence, it is just a list

23

of the named plaintiffs coupled with the same set generalized facts for each one. See CCAC, at ¶¶

24

103-106. Such allegations do not suffice to “nudge” their CIPA claim “across the line from

25

conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.

26

For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not stated a CIPA claim.

27
28
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1

IV.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Facebook’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket Item No. 44) is

2
GRANTED as follows:
3
1.

The withdrawn claim for violation of the CFAA is DISMISSED WITHOUT

4
LEAVE TO AMEND.
5
2.

The claims for invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, conversion, trespass

6
to chattels, and for violation of the UCL, violation of the CCCL and violation of the CLRA are
7
DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for lack of standing.
8
3.

The claims for violation of the Wiretap Act, violation of the SCA and violation of

9
CIPA are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim.
10

Facebook’s request for judicial notice (Docket Item No. 45) is DENIED because this

11
United States District Court
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motion was resolved without relying on those documents.
12
Any amended complaint must be filed on or before November 30, 2015.
13
The court schedules this case for a Case Management Conference at 10:00 a.m. on
14
January 14, 2016. The parties shall file a Joint Case Management Conference Statement on or
15
before January 7, 2016.
16
17
IT IS SO ORDERED.
18
Dated: October 23, 2015
19
20
21

______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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